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Land fragmentation, where a single farm has a number of parcels of land, is a common
feature of agriculture in many countries, especially in developing countries. In Vietnam,
land fragmentation is common, especially in the north. For the whole country, there
are about 75 million parcels of land, an average of seven to eight plots per farm house-
hold. Such fragmentation can be seen to have negative and positive beneﬁts for farm
households and the community generally. Comparative statics analysis and analysis of
survey data have led to the conclusion that small-sized farms are likely to be more
fragmented, and that fragmentation had a negative impact on crop productivity and
increased family labour use and other money expenses. Policies which allow the
appropriate opportunity cost of labour to be reﬂected at the farm level may provide
appropriate incentives to trigger farm size change and land consolidation. Policies
which tip the beneﬁts in favour of fewer and larger plots, such as strong and effective
research and development, an active extension system and strong administrative









Land fragmentation, where a single farm has a number of parcels of land, is
a common feature of agriculture in many countries, especially in developing
countries. Land fragmentation is considered an impediment to efﬁcient crop
production and many countries have implemented policies encouraging land





. 1992), Albania, Bulgaria (Sabates-Wheeler 2002) and
are now being considered in Vietnam. In the larger context, if land fragmen-
tation means that more labour and other resources are used than is necessary
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and that these resources can be used more effectively elsewhere in the economy,
then there is likely to be an overall economic gain from reduced fragmentation.
However, even though land fragmentation may have negative impacts on
farms and the overall economy, there are reasons why there may be beneﬁts
to farmers from some degree of fragmentation. Land fragmentation can
mean that farmers have land plots of different quality, allowing them to
diversify their crops, spread labour requirements, and reduce production and
price risks.
The aim of the paper is to investigate the current situation of land frag-
mentation in the north of Vietnam, and its effects on and relationship to crop
productivity. Comparative statics analysis is used to examine the relationship
between land fragmentation and farm size, agricultural production ability,
off-farm jobs, and the amount of land rented-in and -out. A key hypothesis
investigated is that consolidation of agricultural land in Vietnam is desirable
in the long run.
The paper is organised as follows. In sections 1 and 2 some background to
Vietnamese agriculture and the issue of land fragmentation is presented.
Causes, advantages and disadvantages of land fragmentation are discussed in
section 3. Evidence of land fragmentation in the north of Vietnam and its
relationship to crop productivity, farm size and other factors are the subject
of section 4. The comparative statics analysis is presented in section 5. In
section 6 an empirical model is proposed which allows the examination of
effects of land fragmentation on crop productivity. Conclusions and policy












 policy aimed to shift the Vietnamese
economy from a central planning model to one largely based on market prin-
ciples. In the agricultural sector, Resolution 10 in 1988 recognised the farm
household as an autonomous economic unit, freed-up markets for inputs and
outputs, recognised private ownership of the means of production (except
land) and provided longer terms for land use (Pingali and Xuan 1992; Hung
and Murata 2001). The new land policies contributed to the demise of collec-
tivised agriculture, although less so in the south where collectivisation had
been limited (Kerkvliet 1995).
The 1993 Land Law formalised the allocation of land use rights to farmers
begun after Resolution 10. Farmers were allocated land for long-term use
and granted ﬁve rights of land use including the rights of transfer, exchange,
lease, inheritance and mortgage. By virtue of providing increased security of
tenure over land, facilitating access to credit and making land use rights
tradeable, the 1993 Land Law is seen as providing the foundations for a
formal market for land (Do and Iyer 2003). In the north, the land allocation
process varied between districts, although equity between households was a 
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) in a household. Other considerations inﬂuencing
land allocations were social policies, the irrigation system, distance to plots
and capacity for crop rotation. In order to maintain the principle of equality,
each household was allocated plots with different locations and land quality.
As a result, households have a number of plots, often scattered over a wide
area. For the whole country, there are about 75 million parcels of land, an





has shown the land allocation process to have been remarkably equitable
(Ravallion and van de Walle 2001).
There are different degrees of land fragmentation throughout Vietnam,
with some regions and locations being more seriously fragmented than
others. In the south of Vietnam, the degree of land fragmentation is not so
pronounced. There was less concern with equitable distribution in the south,
and land allocation to households was also more likely to be based on land
held prior to re-uniﬁcation in 1975 (Luong and Unger 1999; Ravallion and
van de Walle 2001; Do and Iyer 2003). However, in the north of Vietnam in
1998, farms in the Red River Delta (RRD) and the Northern Mountainous
region had, on average, 7 and 10–20 plots, respectively (Lan 2001).
Concern about land fragmentation resulting from this ‘equitable’ allocation
of agricultural land has emerged in recent years with some authors asserting
that fragmentation seems to be a serious problem for agricultural production
in Vietnam (Lan 2001; Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2002;
Research Institute of Agricultural Planning 2004). In 1998, the government
issued a policy to promote the exchange of land plots to encourage larger
plot areas. Since then, provinces in the north, especially in the RRD, have
established steering committees to conduct pilot studies on plot exchange.
Throughout the whole country, there are 700 communes in 20 provinces
where plot exchanges were and are being implemented. In these areas land
was effectively re-allocated to farmers with the aim of reducing the number
of plots. In Thanh Hoa province, for example, plot numbers decreased by
51 per cent after three years of implementation of the policy (1998–2001).
On average, the number of plots per farm household decreased from 7.8 to
3.8 plots (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2002).
Reports to the central and local governments have argued that plot
exchange should be implemented where farmers realise there is a problem
caused by fragmentation and plot exchange is unlikely to lead to new conﬂicts
over land allocation. However, promoting voluntary exchange of plots between
farmers to overcome land fragmentation is a narrow policy approach com-
pared to policies favouring the development of the market for land use rights,
such as effective land titling and reducing restrictions on the transfer of land
use rights. In many provinces the land re-allocation process has occurred
without much input from farmers. Often farmers have only been involved in
the assessment of land quality in order to determine the exchange coefﬁcients
between different classes of land. 
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2.1 Reasons for land fragmentation
 
In the literature, researchers have classiﬁed causes of land fragmentation into





. 1992). The supply-side causes refer to an exogenous imposition
on farmers of a pattern of land areas, while the second reﬂects varying





A supply-side explanation of land fragmentation puts the view that it may
happen involuntarily as a result of historical and geographical issues, popu-
lation pressure and patterns of inheritance (Bentley 1987). Historical issues
may be more signiﬁcant where land is scarce. In most developing countries
in Africa and Asia where labour is cheap, crop production is mainly carried
out by hand cultivation and animal traction. This is suited to small-scale
and self-sufﬁcient production. In such cases fragmentation results, and can
also be a result of geographical conditions where the terrain is hilly and
upland areas exist. Historical and geographical causes of land fragmen-
tation are hard to overcome and it may take a long time to consolidate such
land areas.
Land fragmentation can also be explained by pressure of population




. 1992). Farms in regions where population
growth is high and farmers have less off-farm opportunities may be more
fragmented. Another cause of land fragmentation can be inheritance, where
farmers want to give their children land of similar quality. Also land fragmenta-
tion can arise from the failure of land markets to operate effectively because





1992). The above mentioned explanations are observed in many developing









In Vietnam, land fragmentation has mainly been caused by the land allo-
cation process (Hung and MacAulay 2002; Research Institute of Agricultural
Planning 2004). Furthermore, an inadequate regulatory framework and high
transactions costs restrict participation in land market transactions (AusAID
2001; World Bank 2003; Asian Development Bank 2004).
‘Demand-side’ causes of land fragmentation arise when farmers consider
that land fragmentation may have some beneﬁts. In this case it is possible for




. 1992; Hung and MacAulay 2002). By cultivating plots in different areas
(such as lowland and upland), variation in output may be less because the
risks caused by drought, ﬂood and diseases are spread. Another reason farmers
want to keep fragmented farms is that they may be able to use their seasonal
labour more effectively. Although labour is generally in surplus in Vietnam,
especially in the RRD, in peak times (transplanting and harvesting periods)
and during the winter crop growing period, more labour is demanded. There-
fore, farmers may reduce peak time labour periods by diversifying crops in
different plots. It is also possible that the transaction costs are sufﬁciently 
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high that farmers are unwilling to undertake the set of land transactions that
would be needed to reduce the degree of fragmentation.
The above demand-side reasons for fragmentation explain the choice of
farmers to retain certain levels of fragmentation that they perceive are
beneﬁcial to them. These positive beneﬁts are the impacts of fragmentation
on risk-spreading, seasonal labour spreading and crop diversiﬁcation.
Another potential beneﬁt is that the land user can mortgage or sell just a
portion of their land. They may also give land to their children as an inher-
itance more easily when the children want to live separately.
However, land fragmentation causes many negative effects including
higher costs, increased negative externalities, loss of land due to boundaries




. 1992; Lan 2001; Hung and MacAulay 2002; Research Institute of Agri-
cultural Planning 2004). Production costs may also be higher due to higher
costs for labour, as it takes more time to travel between plots and to operate
an activity such as irrigation for many small units of land. A major source of
higher production costs is higher transport costs for inputs and outputs.
Other problems caused by fragmentation may be higher negative externalities
which can happen when farmers cultivate different crops or varieties (Bentley
1987). This leads to greater potential for disputes between neighbours. Land
fragmentation also causes land loss due to plot boundaries or bunds and
access routes. This land loss is directly related to the number of plots. In
addition, it is hard to apply some new technologies when farms are small and
fragmented. This is likely to be a main disadvantage of land fragmentation in
Vietnam. These advantages and disadvantages of land fragmentation are
summarised in Table 1.
Although there are disadvantages of land fragmentation, farmers in many
provinces, especially in the north and north central regions of Vietnam, still
retain their many parcels of land. Historical and institutional constraints dis-
cussed previously are likely to be key reasons for this. However, it is possible
that farmers could beneﬁt from some degree of land fragmentation, by
reducing risks from ﬂood, drought and diseases, making more efﬁcient use of
seasonal labour and enabling crop diversiﬁcation.
 
3. Land fragmentation in the north of Vietnam: evidence from survey data
3.1 Measuring land fragmentation
 
There is no standard measurement of land fragmentation. This leads to
difﬁculties in determining when farm households are ‘very fragmented’ or
‘less fragmented’. Bentley (1987) reports that most authors have used two
simple measures together to assess land fragmentation: the average number
(either regional or national) of plots per farm and the average farm size.
However, some authors have considered that land fragmentation should be
measured by six parameters: farm size, the number of plots, plot size, plot 
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shape, spatial distribution and the size distribution of the ﬁelds (King and
Burton 1982; Bentley 1987). In this paper, two main measures of fragmenta-
tion are used: the number of plots per farm household alone and a measure,
based on Simpson’s diversiﬁcation index, which considers the number of




. (1992) have also used these two
indicators to measure land fragmentation in Ghana and Rwanda. Simpson’s































. This index has a value
between zero and one. A value of zero means that the farm household has
only one parcel or plot of land, which indicates complete land consolidation,
while a value close to one means the household has numerous plots and the
farm is ‘very fragmented’.
 
3.2 Evidence of fragmentation from survey data
 
Two provinces in the north, Ha Tay and Yen Bai, were chosen as research
sites. In each province, two districts, one where farm sizes were smaller than
average and the other where farm sizes were larger than average, were chosen.
This same procedure was followed in selecting two communes in each dis-
trict. Dai Dong and Thach Hoa communes in Thach That district, and Song
Phuong and Tho Xuan communes in Dan Phuong district were selected in
Ha Tay province. In Yen Bai province, the four communes were Dai Dong
and Bao Ai in Yen Binh district, and Mau Dong and Dong Cuong in
Table 1 Costs and beneﬁts associated with land fragmentation
Beneﬁts of many plots Costs of many plots
Private beneﬁts Public beneﬁts Private costs Public costs
Immediate and ongoing beneﬁts/costs
Risk spreading Equality of treatment Cost increases Less labour released
– Flooding Implicit insurance More labour used Higher transaction
– Diseases and pests Access difﬁcult costs when used






Inheritance ﬂexibility Increased biodiversity Disputes increased Mechanisation delayed
Small parcels to Reduced spread Irrigation difﬁcult Application of new
transfer/sell/mortgage of diseases Mechanisation 
difﬁcult
technology delayed
Application of new Planning of commercial
technology difﬁcult production zones difﬁcult
Land use planning difﬁcult
(   (/ ) ) 1
22 −Σ jj aA 
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Van Yen district. Data for two years (2000 and 2001) were collected from
approximately 200 households using prepared questionnaires.
Ha Tay province located in the RRD is characterised by low-lying land
and a small farm size, while Yen Bai province is located in an upland region
and has a larger farm size. The distribution of land types is different in the
two regions, with farms in Yen Bai having a higher percentage of forestry
land than Ha Tay. This is one reason for the larger farm size. Part of Ha Tay
province has some upland area, and therefore the average farm size is likely
to be larger than that of other provinces in the RRD. Average farm sizes
including settlement land, agricultural land, ponds, and forestry land in Ha




  in the year 2000, respectively
(Table 2). More than 40 per cent of the surveyed farms in Ha Tay had a farm
Table 2 Land fragmentation in Ha Tay and Yen Bai provinces, 2000
Provinces Yen Bai Ha Tay Total
Number of households 91 97 188
Farm size (m
2)
Mean 24 327 5232 14 475
Median 11 890 3702 4176
Areas of plot (m
2)
Mean 3222 847 2116
Average area of smallest plots 211 303 258
Average area of largest plots 17 751 2741 10 007
Simpson’s index Percentage of households
0–0.2 19.8 4.1 11.7
0.2–0.4 17.6 3.1 10.1
0.4–0.6 16.5 18.6 17.6
0.6–0.8 30.8 42.3 36.7
0.8–1.0 15.4 32.0 23.9
Mean† 0.51 0.68 0.59
Median† 0.58 0.72 0.68
Number of plots Percentage of households
≤ 2 8.8 3.1 5.9
3–5 25.3 48.5 37.2
6–8 28.6 27.8 28.2
9–11 13.2 11.3 12.2
> 11 24.2 9.3 16.5
Mean† 7.55 6.18 6.84
Median† 7 5 6
Distance from house to plot (m) Percentage of plots
0–300 23.3 18.5 21.1
300–700 43.7 32.2 38.4
700–1000 11.5 11.9 11.7
1000–3000 18.3 34.7 25.8
> 3000 3.2 2.7 3.0
Mean (m)† 653.1 805.4 722.9
Median† 500 600 500
Note: †Expressed in relevant units, not percentages. 
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, while in Yen Bai this ﬁgure was 31 per cent. Only
3 per cent of the surveyed farms in Ha Tay had a farm size larger than two
hectares, while in Yen Bai this ﬁgure was 37 per cent, and even higher in
some communes such as Dai Dong (55 per cent).
Farm size is closely related to plot size, as when farm size is small, individual
plot areas on average cannot be very large. In Ha Tay, the average farm size
and plot size in a commune with smaller average farm size (Dai Dong) were




, while these ﬁgures for a commune with larger aver-




, respectively. The same
situation was observed in Yen Bai province. Of the total number of plots in
Ha Tay and Yen Bai, 53 per cent and 54 per cent respectively, had areas of




, although the average areas of plots in the two provinces








 in Yen Bai). These average
plot area differences are explained by larger forestry land plots in Yen Bai.
Households in the surveyed areas had an average of 6.8 plots of land, with
the ﬁgures for Ha Tay and Yen Bai being 6.2 and 7.6 plots, respectively
(Table 2). The average number of plots also varied from region to region and
commune to commune. Only 9 per cent of farms in Ha Tay had more than
11 plots, while this ﬁgure for Yen Bai was more than 24 per cent. If the degree of
fragmentation is measured by the number of plots, Yen Bai’s farms were
‘more fragmented’ than those in Ha Tay, while if the degree of fragmentation
is measured by Simpson’s index the conclusion is the reverse. On average,
Simpson’s index was 0.68 for farms in Ha Tay and 0.51 for those in Yen Bai.
More than 74 per cent of farms in Ha Tay had a value of the index higher
than 0.6 while for Yen Bai it was only 46 per cent. This means that in Yen
Bai there were larger plots and/or smaller plots because this index is sensitive
to the area of the largest or smallest plots.
Land fragmentation can be more serious if plots are scattered over wider
areas. To measure this, farmers were asked to estimate the distances from
their farm houses to each of their plots. According to data in Table 2, about
37 per cent and 22 per cent of the total number of plots in Ha Tay and Yen Bai,
respectively, were located further than 1 km from the farmer’s house.
 
4. Comparative statics farm model
 
In this paper, a household model related to the crop production of the house-
hold is used. It is assumed that a labour market exists in which households
can hire labour and be employed. There is also assumed to be a market for
land use rights; that is, farmers can rent-out or rent-in land. Credit is con-
strained. A household must pay some transaction costs for their entry into
the land transaction and credit markets. Land fragmentation (the number of





































able was introduced by Deininger and Jin (2003), and although agricultural 
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ability is unobservable it varies among producers and can be estimated from
production functions derived from the household panel data which will have
household ﬁxed effects. A detailed estimation of this variable is given in
Hung (2006).































































 is the farm-speciﬁc parameter that captures the agricultural production
































; xij is a vector of inputs
used in plot j of household i, and Σjxij = Xi; aij is the area of plot j of house-
hold i, and Σjaij = Ai (Ai is operating area of household i).
A householder is assumed to maximise his/her income from three sources:
agricultural production outputs from all plots, off-farm work and renting-out
(or -in) land. Thus for household i:
(2)
where Pi is the price of output; Li = Lﬁ + Loi is the total household labour;
Lﬁ = Σjlﬁj is the total labour working on farm; Loi = Li – Lﬁ = Li – Σjlﬁj is the
total labour working off-farm; Lhi = Σjlhij is the total hired-in labour; w1 and
w2 are wages of off-farm jobs and hired-in labour, respectively.
G
bor = 1, if the household borrows money, and 0 otherwise;
G
out = 1, if the household rents out land, and 0 otherwise;
G
in = 1, if the household rents in land, and 0 otherwise.
If G
out = 1, then G
in = 0 and G




in = 0, if the household has no land transaction (no renting-in or -out);
r1 and T1 are interest rate and credit transaction costs, respectively;
r2 and T2 are the land rental rate and transaction costs, respectively.
T3 is the transaction cost associated with fragmentation. It is assumed
that an increase in the number of plots may increase some costs of transpor-
tation, labour use and other costs so that the effect is to increase the direct
costs.
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Assume that the production function, F(·), satisﬁes the standard assumptions:
This means that positive marginal products and diminishing marginal
returns are required. In solving the maximisation problem (2) a household
will choose optimal levels of  . It is assumed that the pro-
duction function, F(·), is identical for households but not for plots. There are
different marginal value products for different plots (even if a major part of
the land area is a cultivated rice crop) because of land quality. In the later
section, dummy variables are included to capture land quality in the empirical
model. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem (2) for each household are
(where the conditions relating to plots are summed for the household and




for households who borrow money
(5)
,( 5 ′)
for households who borrow money
, (6)
 for households who rent-out land
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for households who rent-out land
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Thus, for households who do not rent land in or out (no land transactions):
(7)
(7′)
for households who borrow money.
The ﬁrst order conditions allow the derivation of a set of comparative
statics conclusions and a full derivation of these is given in Hung (2006).
Equation (3) implies that the total value of the marginal product of family
labour from all plots of a household should be equal to the off-farm wage
multiplied by the number of plots. If the total returns to family labour are
maintained at some level, an increase in the off-farm wage will reduce the
number of plots. Thus, the opportunity for off-farm labour is one of the key
factors that will encourage land consolidation.
Conclusions drawn from the full comparative statics derivations detailed in
Hung (2006), include the following points. These conclusions relate to the new
optimal equilibrium situation that results when speciﬁc variables, such as agri-
cultural ability, number of plots and transaction costs, are marginally changed.
• The optimal level of farm land operated by the household increases with
increasing agricultural production ability of the household, α. The amount
of land rented-in also increases with increasing agricultural production
ability of the household and decreases for households with a higher land
endowment, A. Therefore, rental markets will tend to lead to ‘small/poor
but efﬁcient’ crop producers (Deininger and Jin 2003). Currently, most of
the rural population in Vietnam is still involved in agricultural production
because the opportunity for off-farm jobs is limited. However, in the future
when the opportunity for off-farm employment is greater, land may tend to
be transferred to small-sized farms with high agricultural ability.
• An increase in the number of plots will lead to a reduction in the total farm
area that is optimal. Thus, small-sized farms are likely to be ‘more frag-
mented’ than large-sized farms. This seems to be for the case in North
Vietnam where small-sized farms are often located in areas of more fertile
land and tend to be fragmented. Farmers with land in the fertile RRD in
North Vietnam tend to keep all their plots even when plot size is small.
Bentley (1987) also reported that land fragmentation is present for small,
subsistence-orientated production.
• Households who rent-out land will rent-out more land if the land is more
fragmented. However, households who rent-in land will rent-in less land in
the case where land is more fragmented. Thus, if farm land is fragmented, the
farming sector has insufﬁcient incentives to attract farmers to be involved
in agricultural production and farmers tend to leave farming. In addition,
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increasing agricultural production ability of the household. Therefore, an
effective system of extension and training to increase agricultural ability
is needed to facilitate land consolidation.
• The farm area operated by a household decreases with an increase in trans-
action costs associated with the credit market, the land rental market and
land fragmentation. A decrease in transaction costs will increase the optimal
farm size. Therefore, reducing transaction costs or a strong administrative
system may assist the process of land accumulation to be more active and
give farmers greater incentives to increase farm production.
•A   r easonable assumption is that households with high agricultural ability
that specialise in agricultural production will continue to rent-in land and
their off-farm opportunities will remain the same as before. Those house-
holds with low agricultural ability who join the off-farm labour force will
take advantage of an increase in off-farm wages, w1. The amount of land
rented-out increases as off-farm wages increase. Thus, an increase in the
wage rate for off-farm employment may increase land transacted in the
rental market. This may lead to a decrease in the equilibrium rental rate
which will make everybody better off (Deininger and Jin 2003). An
increase in the opportunity for off-farm jobs may be a key policy to
encourage not only an active market for land use rights but also agricul-
tural production and an increase in farmers’ incomes.
5. An empirical model and results
If the production function in Equation (2) follows constant returns to size,
then the output function is equivalent to the yield function. When returns to
size are unclear, instead of the output function, the yield function can be
estimated with the adjusted land areas.
The yield function can be written as:
(8)
where y is the yield, lf and lh are family and hired labour, respectively, x is a vector
of other variable production inputs (fertilisers, seed, pesticides, etc.), N is the
number of plots and α is the agricultural production ability of farm households.
It is assumed that land fragmentation affects the level of production inputs used.
The yield function, y is assumed to be separable into functions F and h.
Function F is the yield per unit of land area while function h incorporates
economies of farm size (MacAulay and Hertzler 2000). If there are no economies
or diseconomies of size, µ1 will be one, µ2 will be zero and function h will
equal the area A. Function F can be designed with the variables in different
forms. In order to examine the relationship between not only fragmentation
and productivity but also between fragmentation and production inputs, the
translog form is used. However, the problem of collinearity occurs for the full




   (() ,  () ,  () )    ()




µµ 12Land fragmentation in Vietnam 207
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
translog form. Therefore, the squared terms and interactive terms of variables
with few observations are excluded from the model. For example, there are
only 81 observations for hired labour in the total 508 observations.
In the model, it was expected that fragmentation, represented by the
number of plots, would have a negative sign while dummies for the number
of crops (representing soil quality), cash crops and land use change would
have positive signs. Land use change means that farm households change
land use from ‘traditional crops’ (e.g. rice, corn, vegetables) to fruits, ﬁsh or
ﬂowers. Results are given in Table 3.
Table 3 Results from frontier regression analysis of annual crop yield function for Ha Tay
and Yen Bai provinces
Estimates† Coefﬁcients t value
Intercept 6.751 23.65***
Seed application 0.106 2.14**
Nitrogen input –0.141 –2.08**
Potassium input –0.034 –0.80
Phosphorus input –0.001 –0.10
Family labour –0.212 –3.85***
Hired labour 0.021 1.70*
Other money expenses –0.111 –3.13***
Number of plots –1.081 –5.13***
Farm area 0.074 2.25**
Farm areas (exp) –0.001 –1.65*
Seed application × Nitrogen 0.013 1.67*
Seed application × Potassium –0.003 –1.67*
Seed application × Family labour –0.040 –2.85***
Seed application × Other money expenses 0.011 1.64*
Seed application × Number of plots –0.016 –1.12
Nitrogen × Potassium 0.021 2.59***
Nitrogen × Phosphorus –0.001 –0.27
Nitrogen × Family labour 0.016 0.53
Nitrogen × Other money expenses 0.023 1.57
Nitrogen × Number of plots 0.062 1.19
Potassium × Phosphorus –0.002 –1.36
Potassium × Family labour 0.003 0.26
Potassium × Other money expenses –0.008 –0.94
Potassium × Number of plots 0.019 1.20
Family labour × Other money expenses 0.022 1.58
Family labour × Number of plots 0.211 3.52***
Other money expenses × Number of plots 0.064 1.56
Dummy for the number of crops (soil quality) 0.195 3.81***
Dummy for paddy crops –0.126 –2.62***
Dummy for cash crops 0.407 6.66***
Dummy for land use change 0.452 6.58***
Sample size, n 508
Log likelihood function –265.39
Lambda squared ( ) 0.464 2.85***
Sigma-squared ( ) 0.098 11.38***
Notes: ***, ** and * are signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. †The dependent variable is the
equivalent rice yield of a crop rotation (kg/sao/year).
λσ σ
22 2    / = uv
σv
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The production function was estimated using frontier regression methods
with panel data (508 plot-based observations over two years from agricul-
tural land on 188 farm households in the north of Vietnam). The software
used was LIMDEP version 7.0 (Greene 1998). From the results it would
seem that a reasonable response function has been estimated (transcendental
form in land area and translog form in other variable inputs except hired
labour). The λ
2 which is equal to   (where   is the variance of the one-
side error term, U and   is the variance of two-side disturbances, V) were
reasonable and signiﬁcantly different from zero at 1 per cent indicating that
the model disturbances capture technical inefﬁciency.
For the estimated model, the coefﬁcient of farm area and its exponential
term were statistically different from zero. This means that, statistically, farm
area has been shown to have an effect on productivity as reﬂected in the
equivalent rice yield. As a result, an increase in farm area may increase crop
yield but with decreasing rates. Thus, in terms of farm area, economies of
farm size are likely to be present in the north of Vietnam. If farm size is
measured by output, returns to size do not seem to be present in the research
area, that is, the production function follows constant returns to size in
relation to output (Hung 2006).
The coefﬁcient of the number of plots was statistically different from zero
and negative. In addition, the partial elasticity of the number of plots was
negative.
1 This result suggests that there is a negative effect of plot number on
farm performance. Wan and Cheng (2001) also found that there was a
negative relationship between the number of plots and individual crop pro-
ductivity in China. The coefﬁcients of interaction terms between the number of
plots and family labour and other money expenses were also statistically
different from zero and positive, supporting the idea that the number of plots
has increased family labour costs and other money expenses. Therefore,
fragmentation has shown an effect on not only crop productivity but also on
labour and other money expenses.
The coefﬁcient of family labour was also statistically different from zero at
1 per cent and negative. The direct effect of family labour on the equivalent
rice yield may be negative. Agricultural labour in Vietnam is in surplus supply;
therefore, farmers use more family labour than needed on their ﬁelds. How-
ever, on average the elasticity of family labour was positive but small. If the
level of seed application remains at some level, a reduction in the number of
plots may cause the elasticity of family labour to be negative.
2 This result
suggests that the number of plots also increases the level of family labour
used, therefore land consolidation or a reduction in the number of plots of
the farm household may release more labour for other sectors of the economy.
1 The elasticity of the number of plots is equal to –0.32 which is estimated with other vari-
ables at average levels.
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Farmers in the north of Vietnam, especially in the RRD, apply intensive
farming techniques for annual crops and rice. In the range of data being con-
sidered, farmers had high technical efﬁciency and the production function
‘operated’ in the ‘ﬂat’ areas around the maximum point of the function.
Thus, an increase in inputs may not increase productivity (Hung 2006).
3 For
the estimated model, the coefﬁcients of nitrogen input and other money
expenses were signiﬁcant but negative. This result suggests that the direct
effects of these inputs on crop productivity are negative. On average, the elas-
ticity of nitrogen was negative while it was positive for other money expenses.
This is the case because in the research sites 71 per cent of cultivated land
was for rice which is a major crop in the north and the RRD.
4
The coefﬁcients of the dummies for cash crops and land use change were
statistically different from zero and had positive signs while the coefﬁcient
of the dummy for paddy crops (rice, corn, cassava and sweet potato) was neg-
ative. This means that paddy crops have lower equivalent yields than other
crops and farmers may increase their crop outputs as well as income by pro-
ducing cash crops (vegetables, soybean, peanuts, ﬂowers and fruit). Farmers’
crop outputs and their incomes increase as crop patterns change from
producing ‘traditional crops’ to other crops such as fruit, ﬂowers and ﬁsh. This
result suggests that retaining a ‘quota’ policy on the area of rice land may not
help farmers to increase their outputs and incomes. Under current government
policy, land required to grow rice remains at about four million hectares.
Another model (not reported here) showed that land fragmentation was
positively and signiﬁcantly related to crop diversity (Hung 2006). In the
context of subsistence-orientated agricultural production, this may lead to
security of farmers’ incomes. The trade-off between the level of crop diversity
and land fragmentation and commercial production is an area for further study.
6. Conclusion
From a theoretical point of view, fragmentation of plots on farms has
beneﬁts and costs as listed in Table 1. These beneﬁts and costs will be differ-
ent for different farm households and thereby affect the economics of land
fragmentation for individual households and society.
In this paper, various methods have been used to investigate the economics
of land fragmentation, including both theoretical comparative statics analysis
and empirical analysis of survey data from farm households in the north of
Vietnam. Using survey data from 508 plot-based observations from 188 farm
households in the north of Vietnam it was found that fragmentation had a
negative impact on crop productivity (measured in equivalent rice yield) and
increased family labour use and other money expenses.
3 The elasticity of seed application is equal to 0.07, nitrogen –0.04, potassium 0.05, and
other money expenses 0.19 which are estimated at the average levels of other inputs.
4 There are 359 observations for rice and corn in the total 508 observations.210 P. Van Hung et al.
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As Vietnam appears to have surplus agricultural labour, at least for much
of the production year, the real beneﬁts to farm households from land con-
solidation may not be apparent until the real opportunity cost of farm labour
begins to rise. This opportunity cost will clearly be affected by a number of
factors such as the availability of employment opportunities for the farm
family members and the wage rate associated with these opportunities, the
level of education and age of the rural workforce, the time of year and season.
The transaction costs involved in job search will be an issue as will the
reliability of the employment. Therefore, creation of new off-farm jobs and
movement of the agricultural labour force to other sectors of the economy
will be a key policy for agricultural and rural development in the future.
Administration reforms are being considered in Vietnam. This may lead to
a reduction in the transaction costs associated with the credit market, the
market for land-use rights and land fragmentation. Comparative statics
analysis suggests that if this were the case then land consolidation would be
encouraged and the market for land-use rights would likely be more active.
In the future, agricultural land may be concentrated in the hands of house-
holds who have a high agricultural ability. Comparative statics analysis also
shows that land fragmentation is likely to decrease with increasing agricultural
production ability. Therefore, expansion and improvement of the extension
and training systems in rural areas should facilitate land consolidation.
These results have a wider applicability beyond Vietnam. Across many
developing countries land fragmentation is a signiﬁcant policy issue. There
are tradeoffs involved but it is apparent that as the opportunity cost of
labour rises there will be incentives for land consolidation. In a similar way,
if the transactions costs associated with land transactions can be reduced,
and productivity raised then land consolidation will be more likely to occur.
These are general ﬁndings resulting from basic economic decision-making
processes of farm households.
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